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Abstract
This study investigates whether the willingness to take income risks
revealed by occupational choice is transmitted from parents to their
children. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP),
we nd that fathers' riskiness of job is a signicant determinant of
children's occupational risk, in particular sons' (excluding parent-child
pairs with identical occupations). This is the rst piece of evidence for
intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes relying on real world
behavior. It shows that not only individuals' own assessments of their
risk attitudes correlate across generations (found by previous studies)
but also risk preferences shown in exactly the same situation.
Classication: Risk preferences, intergenerational transmission, occu-
pational choice
JEL Code: D12, D81, J24
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1A crucial determinant of almost any decision in life is an individual's
risk attitude. The often observed similarity between children's and parents'
income or wealth suggests resemblance of their decisions. Given its impor-
tance, an underlying reason might be similarity of their risk taking. While
several studies nd that parents and children report similar risk attitudes in
surveys, no evidence exists showing that parents and children also exhibit
the same willingness to take risk in real life situations. The lively debate
regarding the appropriate measurement of risk attitudes strongly suggests
that it is important to study whether intergenerational transmission of risk
attitudes can also be established in a revealed preference approach.
Previous evidence for intergenerational transmission is based on self-
assessments of individuals' risk attitudes (Charles and Hurst (2003), Ar-
rondel (2009), Hryshko et al. (2011) and Dohmen et al. (forthcoming)).
While all studies nd a signicantly positive correlation between children's
and parents' risk tolerance, in some of the analyses the link depends on the
respondent's strength of risk aversion. A few tentative attempts have been
made to explain children's stated risk attitudes with the parents' actual risk
behavior, i.e., them being self-employed (De Paola forthcoming, Hryshko et
al. 2011). However, thorough evidence for children and parents showing
similarly risky behavior is lacking.
The advantage of survey data is that they oer an easy way to learn
about individual's attitudes. The validity of responses to survey questions,
however, suers from a number of biases (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan
2001). Dohmen et al. (2011) mitigate concerns by validating the reliability
of the stated risk preferences employed by Dohmen et al. (forthcoming)
in an experiment. However, analyses dealing with the consistency of an
individual's risk attitude across measures experimentally elicited and those
based on surveys yield contradictory results (e.g. Deck et al. 2008, Anderson
and Mellor 2009). While stated risk preferences have been found to be a
signicant determinant of actual risk taking behavior, they only explain a
small fraction of the variation in real world decisions (Barsky et al. 1997).
An explanation for these results is that risk preferences dier across con-
texts (Weber et al. 2002, Dohmen et al. 2011). Such dierences are hardly
2captured by lottery questions or individuals' global assessments of their risk
attitude on which most stated preference approaches are based. Dohmen et
al. (forthcoming) provide evidence for intergenerational transmission based
on self-reported risk attitudes regarding dierent domains, e.g. health and
career. Yet the question whether parents and children also exhibit similar
risk behavior in exactly the same situation remains open.
The purpose of the present paper is to study these issues. Employing a
revealed preference approach, we endorse the method traditionally pursued
by economists. We focus on the willingness to take risk revealed by an
individual's actual job choice. According to the theory of compensating
wage dierentials, individuals are compensated for non-pecuniary features
of alternative occupations, inter alia the risk that arises from pursuing the
job. Occupations vary by health risk, risk of fatality, or unemployment and
earnings risk. The theory predicts that workers opt for the occupation that
maximizes their utility. Since the cost of bearing occupational uncertainty
are lower for less risk averse individuals, their disutility of working in a risky
job is also lower. Assuming that individuals sort into jobs accordingly, their
choice reveals information regarding their risk attitude (controlling for all
other relevant factors).
This sorting eect allows us to investigate whether intergenerational trans-
mission of risk preferences is indeed re
ected in children's and parents' oc-
cupation being similarly risky. A major asset of our analysis is that we are
thus able to observe the risk connected to dierent generation's behavior in
exactly the same context. By excluding child-parent pairs that work in ex-
actly the same occupation, we rule out the possibility that the link is due to
resembling preferences for a certain job instead of similarity in risk attitudes.
More precisely, we use the cross-sectional variation in monthly income
that is not explained by human capital dierences. This measure, proposed
by McGoldrick (1995), has become the standard for measuring occupational
earnings risk. Employing data from the 1991 to 2009 waves of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we calculate the unexplained variation of in-
come per occupation classied on a 3-digit-level of the International Standard
Classication of Occupations (ISCO). The resulting values are assigned to
3children and parents, whose information we are able to merge.
The analysis shows that dierent generations of a family indeed exhibit
similar risk behavior in exactly the same situation. We observe a signi-
cant relationship between fathers' and children's earnings risk. The eect
is larger and more signicant for sons. We nd no signicant relationship
between mothers' and children's risk behavior. The lack of evidence does
not necessarily imply that mothers exert no eect. The literature generally
takes the risk measure employed in our study as being less reliable for females
(McGoldrick 1995, Bonin et al. 2007). We address concerns regarding the
calculation of the risk measure and the specicity of the transmission eect
in the robustness checks and come to the same conclusions.
The remainder is organized as follows. In section 1, a review of the
literature on intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes is given. The
construction of the risk measure is described in section 2. The procedure and
results of the empirical analysis of intergenerational transmission are reported
in section 3, followed by a discussion of the robustness of our results in section
4. Section 5 concludes.
1 Literature review
In recent years, the assumption of exogenously given and stable risk pref-
erences has been challenged. The endogeneity of preferences has become a
major object of study. Bisin and Verdier (2005) emphasize that \preferences,
beliefs, and norms that govern human behavior are formed partly as a the
result of genetic evolution, and partly they are transmitted through gen-
erations and acquired by learning and other forms of social interactions."1
Following this idea, several studies investigate the issue of intergenerational
transmission of risk preferences.
In an attempt to explain correlation of wealth across generations, Charles
and Hurst (2003) also investigate the correlation of self-reported risk toler-
1In the following, we refrain from a distinction between genetic and cultural inheritance.
Our interest is in whether intergenerational transmission takes place at all and not via
which channel it occurs.
4ance. Using data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) the
authors nd evidence that children and their parents have similar preferences
for income risk if their risk attitudes belong to one of the extreme risk cate-
gories. They nd that stated risk preferences explain little of the propensity
of parents and children owning the same assets. Charles and Hurst speculate
that the similarity of children's and parents' actual choices is due to a ten-
dency of children to mimic their parents' investment behavior. An alternative
interpretation is that risk behavior revealed in a specic situation matters.
The nding could also be interpreted as an indication that the informational
content of responses to hypothetical gambles is limited.
Using the same dataset, Hryshko et al. (2011) principally conrm the
results of a signicant correlation between children's and parents' stated risk
attitude. Unlike the previously described study, the parents' risk attitude
only has a signicant eect on children that are very risk averse (ca. 40%
of sample) but not if the sample is limited to those that are extremely risk
averse (ca. 20% of sample). An explanation for the dierent nding compared
to the previous study is that Hryshko and co-authors take into account the
parents' schooling. They conclude that a direct eect from parental schooling
to children's risk aversion exists. The authors further show that parents'
risky behavior in the respondent's childhood, revealed via family business
ownership, has a negative eect on a child's stated risk aversion.
In a similar vein, De Paola (forthcoming) shows that the riskiness of the
father's but not of the mother's job (self-employment/public sector) mat-
ters for the child's risk aversion. Her analysis relies on responses of Italian
students to a hypothetical lottery question and a question regarding the pre-
ferred job security. As an additional measure she uses students' answering
behavior to an entry examination in which wrong answers are penalized.
The regression results reveal that students whose fathers are entrepreneurs
are less risk averse, while students whose fathers work in the public sector
exhibit higher risk aversion. In contrast, mothers' employment status has no
eect.
Arrondel (2009) studies intergenerational transmission using a measure
of risk attitude created from 27 questions of the DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
5in France. He combines the questions, e.g., whether the respondents take
precautions when weather turns out nasty or whether they buy plane or train
tickets well in advance, as well as traditional lottery questions, in a qualitative
risk score. Regressions of the child's preference score on the parents' one
(mothers and fathers are not distinguished) reveal a positive relationship.
The study most closely related to ours is the one by Dohmen et al. (forth-
coming). The authors provide evidence based on self-reported evaluations of
risk preferences from the SOEP in which respondents are requested to assess
on an 11-point scale: \How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person
who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?" They
nd that the responses of parents and children have a signicantly positive
relationship. This result is observed with respect to the general willingness
to take risks as well as specic domains, i.e., nancial matters, health, car
driving, sports and leisure and career. The correlations between child's risk
attitude with that of their mother and father slightly dier between the do-
mains. For example, mothers and fathers seem to be similarly important for
a child's attitude regarding career risk but fathers are more important with
respect to health risk.
In short, intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes has been estab-
lished based on stated preferences. Two of the studies utilize parents' employ-
ment status as a measure of risk attitude to explain the child's self-reported
risk attitude. However, a thorough investigation of correlation between dif-
ferent generations' risk attitudes revealed by behavior is lacking.
2 Risk attitudes - a revealed preference ap-
proach
2.1 Advantages of a revealed preference measure
The above analyses provide valuable insights into the question whether risk
attitudes are transmitted between generations. An advantage of self-reported
risk measures is that they oer an easy way to study people's attitudes. They
6suer from a number of drawbacks, however, which suggest that analyzing
the issue from a revealed preference perspective is a worthy exercise.
Common objections to stated measures are that the ordering and word-
ing of questions, the low eort exerted on answering questions accurately, the
desire of an individual to convey a certain impression, the absence of hav-
ing an attitude, etc., bias the preferences reported by surveyed individuals
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). Furthermore, the framing of questions
matters (Kahneman and Tversky 1981). Responses to hypothetical lottery
questions involving a new job have been found to be driven by status quo
bias (Kimball et al. 2009). A problem associated with risk attitudes on an
11-point scale - as requested in the SOEP - is that it is a qualitative mea-
sure which is not ideal for comparisons of the degree of risk aversion across
individuals.
To alleviate such objections, Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) refer to another
study by some of the authors (Dohmen et al. 2011) in which the behavioral
relevance of the self-assessment of risk preference requested in the SOEP is
tested in a complementary experiment. In this study, responses to a ques-
tionnaire are compared to behavior in paid real-stakes lotteries. The stated
preferences are found to be a signicant predictor of the riskiness of choices
with real money at stake. The authors thus mitigate concerns regarding the
reliability of the measure.
Nevertheless, analyses dealing with the consistency of individual's risk
attitude across experimentally elicited measures and survey based ones yield
contradictory results (e.g. Deck et al. 2008, Anderson and Mellor 2009).
Ding et al. (2010) replicate the study by Dohmen et al. by comparing ex-
perimental behavior and survey responses of Chinese students. While the
correlations between behavior and the stated measure resemble the ones re-
ported by Dohmen et al. (2011), they conclude that stated risk attitudes
only explain 10% of the variation in the real money situation. Similarly,
while stated risk preferences have been found to be a signicant determinant
of actual risk taking behavior (such as smoking or investments), they only
explain a small fraction of the variation in real world decisions (Barsky et al.
1997).
7Another issue is that risk attitudes have been found to be domain-specic
(e.g. Weber et al. 2002, Deck et al. 2008). Using SOEP data, Dohmen et
al. (2011) nd that the best predictor of a certain behavior (e.g., holding
nancial assets or smoking), is the attitude of risk regarding that specic
domain. Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) show that the parents' self-reported
risk attitude in a specic domain best explains the child's attitude in that
domain. However, even within domains dierences might arise (Vlaev et al.
2010). For instance, an individual might be willing to take income risk but
not health risk to proceed in her career. No existing survey measures capture
such dierences.
The described drawbacks can be avoided by using the approach tradi-
tionally employed in economics. Economists long insisted that inferences on
people's preferences are only possible by observing their actual choices. With
respect to their willingness to take risks, an individual's behavior on nancial
markets, the choice of sports, taking out insurances, or occupational choice is
informative. In this study, we focus on the willingness to take risk associated
with the choice of job. From an economist's perspective, behavior on labor
markets is a particularly relevant issue. Another advantage is that a measure
exists with which the willingness to take occupational risk can be quantied.
2.2 Revealing risk attitudes by occupational choice
According to standard economic theory, an individual chooses an occupa-
tion that maximizes his or her expected utility (Becker 1962). Utility from a
certain job is assumed to be a function of wage, personal traits such as educa-
tion and experience, as well as occupational features like working conditions
or the exposure to dierent types of risk. The theory of compensating (or
equalizing) wage dierentials postulates that in a competitive labor market,
unfavorable working conditions have to be compensated in order to attract
workers (Rosen 1987). Higher risk of future income growth, unemployment,
or health are thus re
ected in a wage premium. Since the costs of bearing
occupational uncertainty are lower for less risk averse individuals, the ex-
pectation of monetary compensation makes them more likely to opt for jobs
8connected to higher risk.
A rich body of empirical literature provides evidence for the existence of
a wage premium. The issue is often analyzed by asking whether workers in
occupations exposed to higher income risk are indeed compensated by higher
wages. Early investigations employ the standard deviation or coecient of
variation of income within an occupation as a measure of risk (King 1974,
Johnson 1977, Feinberg 1981, 1981a).
McGoldrick (1995) proposes another way of approximating earnings risk
that dominates in the subsequent literature. The present study is based on
this measure. First, a standard Mincer wage regression including education,
experience and other characteristics (Mincer 1958, 1974) is estimated. The
residual from that regression is exploited to calculate the variation in monthly
income within an occupation or across time that is unexplained by observable
dierences in the individual's human capital stock. The measure is supposed
to re
ect the income uncertainty of an occupation from an ex ante perspec-
tive. It can therefore be taken as given when making the job decision. Using
this measure, McGoldrick (1995), McGoldrick and Robst (1996), Hartog et
al. (2003), Hartog and Vijverberg (2007) and other studies provide evidence
that compensation of earnings risk in fact takes place.
Furthermore, several studies analyze occupational sorting according to
risk attitudes. Ekelund et al. (2005) nd that agents with a high score in a
psychosometric indicator of risk attitude are more likely to be self-employed.
Dohmen and Falk (2011) conduct a laboratory experiment that shows that
risk averse workers prefer xed payments and are less likely to sort into vari-
able pay schemes. Pfeifer (2011), using SOEP-data, shows that individuals
with relatively high stated risk aversion tend to sort into public sector em-
ployment. Similarly, Guiso and Paiella (2004) provide evidence from Italy
showing that risk-prone individuals are more likely to be self-employed, be a
business entrepreneur, and less likely to work in the public sector. DeLeire
and Levy (2004) show that the risk of injuries has a considerable eect on
an individual's choice of job.
In a study closely related to ours, Bonin et al. (2007) investigate whether
the income risk an individual is willing to take matches his or her stated risk
9attitudes. As the dependent variable, the authors employ the risk measure
proposed by McGoldrick (1995). Based on data from the SOEP, their anal-
ysis establishes a signicantly positive relationship between a higher stated
willingness to take risks and occupations with a higher unexplained variation
of income. Hryshko et al. (2011) conduct the same analysis using data from
the PSID and arrive at the same conclusion.
The theoretical considerations are thus substantiated by empirical evi-
dence. By choosing an occupation in line with their willingness to take risks,
individuals reveal their risk attitude. If risk attitude is transmitted from
parents to children, we should be able to observe that they opt for similar
risky occupations. We use this as our starting point.
2.3 Construction of the risk measure
In constructing a measure of earnings risk, we essentially follow the approach
established in the literature. We rst estimate a Mincer regression and cal-
culate a measure of risk from the resulting residual. In contrast to previous
studies that focus either on residual variation of income over time or across
occupation, we consider both. We use the 1991 to 2009 waves of the SOEP
to generate a measure that allows for variation across observed years within
an occupation. The SOEP was rst conducted in 1984 and expanded to
East Germany in 1990. We include all waves from 1991 onwards (i.e., the
year after full unication), to ensure that dierences between the pre- and
post-reunication period do not bias the results. In our view, the resulting
measure is a representative indicator of the income risk an individual expects
over the life course from an ex ante perspective.
For categorizing occupations, we use the International Standard Classi-
cation of Occupations (ISCO) provided by the International Labor Organisa-
tion.2 This classication groups jobs by similarity of tasks and skills required.
We employ the 3-digit-level of the ISCO88-code which is the second-most
detailed level, sorting occupations into 116 groups. We calculate the un-
2For an extensive documentation see the website of the ILO:
[http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco].
10explained variation of income by occupational groups for the total period
considered. In the analysis, all occupations for which our dataset contains
at least 100 observations are included. This leaves us with 85 dierent occu-
pation groups for males and 62 for females.3
Several adjustments of the raw data apply. The sample is restricted to
adults between age 25 and 55 to avoid biases that may occur in the age-
related tails. We further exclude employees that are not employed full-time.
The wages of part-time workers have a dierent variability and decisions are
possibly made less consciously or based on dierent motives than full-time
employment decisions (Constant and Zimmermann 2003). We also discard
self-employed individuals as the determination of earnings in this sector is
typically not comparable to the earnings of employees. Finally, we exclude
implausible earnings information at the bottom of the distribution of net
earnings by dropping the lowest 1-percentile in every year.
The Mincer regressions are estimated separately for women and men. A
women's choice of job is more likely to be driven by factors that cannot be
captured by the Mincer regression. McGoldrick (1995) nds that women have
a lower percentage of earnings uncertainty attributable to systematic factors.
The fact that female employment opportunities changed substantially over
the last decades might also bias the results. Bonin et al. (2007) only calculate
the measure for men. We include females in our analysis, however. While
the risk measure might be somewhat noisy, a connection might still possibly
exist.
In the specication of our Mincer regression, we follow the common ap-
proach. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the net monthly income of
the individual (logNETINC). Our set of explanatory variables includes the
human capital variables education (EDUC) measured by years of schooling,
experience (EXP) measured by years of professional experience, and tenure
(TEN) measured by years of employment at the current employer. To cap-
ture decreasing returns to experience and tenure, we also include the second
3The substantial reduction in occupations is not re
ected in an equivalent reduction
in observations. We loose less than 2% of the male population and 5% of the female
population. Employing the 4-digit level of the code would imply a much more substantial
reduction of occupations and sample size.
11order polynomial of the last two variables. A binary variable indicating pub-
lic sector employment is included to capture associated dierences in income
(PUBSEC). Summary statistics of those variables are displayed in table 1
in the appendix. As further controls, we include dummies for each occupa-
tion per 3 digit-ISCO code, thus controlling for the average payment level in
that group, dummy variables indicating in which of the 16 German states the
individual resides as well as time dummies. To account for heteroskedasticity,
we employ robust standard errors.
Table 2 shows the results of the OLS regressions for males and females.
The variables explain a large fraction of net monthly earnings. Coecients
are highly signicant with signs as expected. Surprisingly, the eect of being
employed in the public sector substantially diers between genders. Women
employed in the public sector receive higher wages while the opposite eect
is found for males. A possible explanation is that males and females work in
dierent occupations, with typically female occupations being remunerated
better in the public than in private sector.
From these estimates, we compute the measure of earnings risk as the
standard deviation of the residuals in each occupational group where j is the
index indicating the ISCO sub-cell:
j = std(e
^ "j) (1)
For women, the variation of the resulting risk measure ranges from 0.22 to
0.42 with a mean of 0.27 and a standard deviation of 0.045. The unexplained
part of men's income varies between 0.19 and 0.47 with a mean of 0.29 and
standard deviation of 0.064. Gender dierences hence seem to exist. The
earnings risk found by Bonin et al. (2007) - which only applies to males
- ranges from 0.2 to 0.8. An obvious explanation for those dierences is
that we employ a dataset spanning several years and thus containing many
more observations than the dataset by Bonin et al. which only includes
observations from one year. Estimating a pooled cross-section allows us to
control for year-specic eects which lowers the unexplained variance. Hartog
and Vijverberg (2007) show that annual measures are much noisier than risk
12measures based on several years.
The distribution of earnings risk is plausible. For males, the occupational
category with the highest earnings risk is directors and chief executives (ISCO
Code 121) and the one with the lowest encompasses police inspectors and
detectives (345). For females, the highest income risk arises for health pro-
fessionals (222) and the lowest for personal care workers (513). An important
question is whether individuals of each skill level can choose between occupa-
tions connected to dierent degrees of risk. The relationship between income
risk and skill-level of the occupation does not seem to follow a clear pattern.
For each level of required skills/occupational task, occupations with dierent
income risks are available. For instance, male \secondary education teaching
professionals" (232) have an income risk of 0.28 while \other teaching pro-
fessionals" who conduct research and develop or advise on teaching methods
(235) have an income risk of 0.43.
We investigate whether workers are actually compensated for bearing
earnings uncertainty by adding the calculated risk measure in the Mincer
regression. The results show that unexplained earnings variation has a large
and signicantly positive eect. The eect is higher for females than for
males which is the same result obtained by McGoldrick (1995).4 Since we
are not interested in the exact impact of earnings risk on income we refrain
from a rigorous analysis of the relationship.
3 Intergenerational transmission of revealed
risk preferences
3.1 Data
For investigating intergenerational transmission of the willingness to take
earnings risks, we construct a dataset from the SOEP waves of 2001 to 2009.
To avoid in
ating our dataset by including the same or similar information
4Occupation dummies at the 3-digit level are replaced by dummies at the 2-digit level.
Obviously, the former drop out if we include them simultaneously with the job risk mea-
sure. Results available upon request.
13several times, we observe each child-parent pair only once. In case of multiple
observations in dierent years, we keep the most recent observation. This has
the advantage that children are older and occupational decisions presumably
made more consciously.
An important restriction is that we drop children and parents working in
exactly the same occupation. The intention is to rule out the possibility that
similar preferences for a certain job rather than similarities in risk tolerance
drive the decision. We ensure that the risk measure is representative for the
individuals investigated by excluding individuals that are self-employed and
following casual or part-time employment. The latter exclusion is less strict
with respect to parents as we also include part-time workers. Parents might
serve as a role model for occupational risk independent of their current hours
worked. The distinction between full- and part-time workers, however, is
only relevant for mothers. About half of the mothers included in our sample
work part-time. Less than thirty (!) men have that status.
This leaves us with approximately 1500 children for which we also have
information for mothers and fathers, respectively. Some explanatory vari-
ables are only available for fewer pairs so that the number of observations
used in our regressions is lower in some models. The number of observations
drops severely when we include both parents simultaneously. We therefore
estimate separate regressions for mothers and fathers.5
3.2 Descriptive analysis
We merge the information obtained from Mincer regressions to child-parent
pairs according to the 3-digit ISCO code of their occupation. The sample of
parents as well as that of children contains individuals of the whole range of
risk takers. Their earnings risk ranges from the lowest to the highest values,
as can be seen in the upper panel of table 3. Means and variance are sta-
ble across generations and slightly larger for fathers and sons. In the lower
panel, correlations between parents and sons and daughters are shown. Cor-
5Similar results are obtained when we include both simultaneously. Results available
upon request.
14relations are highest between fathers' and sons' measure of risk, followed by
the correlation between fathers and daughters. While mothers and daughters
exhibit some similarity in the riskiness of the job chosen, sons' choices seem
to rarely resemble the ones of their mothers. The correlations indicate that
the relationship between fathers and sons is of particular interest.
Given the lively debate regarding the reliability and consistency of dif-
ferent types of risk measures (e.g. Anderson and Mellor 2009, Reynaud and
Couture 2010), it is interesting to compare our measure to stated risk at-
titudes. In 2004 and 2009, SOEP respondents were asked to assess their
general risk attitude as well as their risk attitude in specic domains, inter
alia career issues, on a scale from 0 to 10. We concentrate on responses from
2009 since most of our child-parent pairs were observed in that year.6
Table 4 displays correlations between the risk measures obtained from
the Mincer regressions with two statements regarding the willingnesses to
take risks. In general, the risk preference revealed by occupational choice is
more closely related to the self-reported risk attitude with respect to career
than to general risk attitude, in line with the hypothesis of domain specic
risk attitudes. A correlation between the measure obtained from real life
decisions and those from stated preferences can clearly be established for
sons and fathers. The correlation is lower for female members of the family.
In particular, mothers' revealed and stated willingness to take risks diers.
The low correlations are in line with previous research that nds that stated
risk preferences only explain a small fraction of the variation in real world
decisions (e.g. Barsky et al. 1997). We refrain from an in-depth analysis on
the relationship which has already been provided by Bonin et al. (2007).
3.3 Regression analysis
3.3.1 Methodology
We are interested in whether the correlations between children's and parent's
risk behavior, as shown in table 3, can be conrmed when controlling for other
determinants. We regress the child's risk variable on the parent's one using
6A comparison to values from 2004 gives similar results.
15four dierent specications. Model 1 is a bivariate regression without any
controls. Model 2 adds personal and labor-market-related variables of the
child except for its income. This variable is added in model 3 so that we can
examine whether the results are biased due to endogeneity in model 2. In
the fourth specication, we include the parent's characteristics. Equation 2
shows the (comprehensive) model of our transmission regressions:
RISKi =  + 1PR RISKi + 2Xi + 3logNETINCi + 4PR Xi + "i
(2)
The dependent variable is the earnings risk associated with the child i's
occupation (RISK) which is assigned according to the 3-digit ISCO code
of the occupation. Our main variable of interest is the earnings risk of the
parent's current occupation (PR RISK). PR RISK is either the mother's
or father's risk measure (indicated in the tables). Provided that intergen-
erational transmission of risk attitudes takes place and is re
ected in the
riskiness of the job chosen being similar, the parent's job risk should be
positively related to the child's job risk.
In various studies, risk preferences have been found to be related to per-
sonal and socio-economic characteristics (e.g. Barsky et al. 1997, Hartog et
al. 2002, Eckel and Grossman 2008, Dohmen et al. forthcoming, 2011). To
control for such eects, we add a variety of explanatory variables in model
two (included in X). First of all, we include the age of the child in the re-
spective year (AGE). Previous research nds that older individuals have a
lower risk tolerance. Gender seems to play an important role, with women
being more risk averse than men (FEMALE). A dummy for being mar-
ried (FAMILY ) captures eects on the willingness to take risk that can
arise from such a commitment. Individuals that are healthy might be more
inclined to take income risks. HEALTH measures an individual's self as-
sessment of his or her status on a 5-point-scale. Additionally, we include
dummies for religion.
Furthermore, we control for other factors that determine occupational
16sorting. The (riskiness of the) occupation chosen should be in
uenced by
the individual's years of schooling (EDUC). Well-educated individuals are
likely to recover from failures more easily. Education has also been found to
have an eect on risk attitudes. Besides, the duration at an employer could
have an in
uence (TEN).7 In Germany, working in the public sector is
usually connected to a more stable development of income. We thus include
a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed in the public sector
(PUBSEC).
Since the historical and economic environment varies between the two
parts of Germany, a binary variable for living in the eastern part of Germany
(EAST) is included. While empirical studies nd limited evidence for signif-
icant dierences in the willingness to take risks (Dohmen et al. 2011, Bonin
et al. 2007, Heineck and S ussmuth 2011), the labor market situation diers
considerably.
The risk taken in an occupation should also be related to the compensa-
tion received for it, i.e., the individual's income. Risk aversion in general has
been found to be related to income and wealth. While some studies nd a
negative relationship (e.g. Hartog et al. 2002), Barksy et al. (1997) show that
the willingness to take risks increases in income and wealth until the middle
of the distributions, and then decreases. Given the potential endogeneity of
this variable, we include the net monthly income in logs (logNETINC) only
in some specications.
Furthermore, controls for family background are required (included in
PR X). Since we estimate separate regressions for mothers and fathers, the
control variables contain information for mother or father, respectively. As
such, we include the parent's years of education (PR EDUC), his or her
age (PR AGE), whether he or she is married (PR FAMILY ) and works
in the public sector (PR PUBSEC). The net household income of the
parental household (PR logHHINC) is included as a proxy for the wealth
of a family. In addition, we control for the residence during the rst 15 years
of life of the parents (big city, small city, small town, countryside, missing) to
7It is not controlled for experience. Due to the young age of children, the variable is
highly correlated with experience and age.
17take into account risk-related eects that stem from growing up in a certain
environment. While it would be interesting to also include this information
for the child, the data is largely unavailable. The parent's residence of youth
might yet serve as a proxy if the family lived or moved to the same type of
region when the child was young. Summary statistics are given in table 5 in
the appendix.
We estimate the models using ordinary least squares (OLS) and include
dummies for the wave from which the observation is drawn in all regressions.8
To take into account heteroskedasticity, all hypothesis tests are calculated
using robust standard errors.
3.3.2 Regression results
Regressions including all children The results of the OLS estimates
can be found in table 6. In regressions including the fathers' earnings risk,
the coecient on the main variable of interest is positive as expected. In
all models, the eect of fathers' risk measure is signicant at the 1% level.
The magnitude of the eect drops once we include children's characteris-
tics. Extending the model by the potentially endogenous income of the child
or fathers' characteristics does not change results. Interestingly, the coef-
cient obtained by Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) in the regressions of the
child's stated career risk attitude on their fathers' one (taking into account
the specicity of intergenerational transmission) is of equal magnitude. No
signicant eect can be found in regressions of the child's risk measure on
the mothers' one. The coecient is insignicant in all regressions.
To interpret the size of the fathers' eect, we multiply the coecient from
the fourth model with the standard deviation of the fathers' risk measure.
An increase in the father's income risk by one standard deviation increases
the risk measure by 0.004. A comparison to absolute dierences of earnings
risk between occupations (in order of increasing values) puts this number into
perspective. The mean dierence of the risk measure between occupations
is 0.002. Accordingly, an increase of father's earnings risk by one standard
8Re-estimating the models with ordered probit yields similar results. Results available
upon request.
18deviation implies that the child opts for a job with an income risk that is
two ranks higher (if all jobs are ordered according to risk).
Concerning the other control variables some further results are notable.
Daughters have a lower earnings risk, as already indicated by descriptive
statistics. Years of education are quantitatively and statistically highly sig-
nicant drivers of occupational risk tolerance. Tenure and working in the
public sector decrease the riskiness of job. None of the parents' controls
enters with signicance.
Regressions by gender of children Given the insignicance of the moth-
ers' risk measure, the question arises whether the eect parents have on
daughters also diers from the eect on sons. We thus split the sample by
children's gender. The results from the regressions are shown in table 7. As
can be seen, we nd a larger correlation between fathers' and sons' risk com-
pared to the regressions including children of both genders. However, a t-test
shows that the dierence is not signicant. The eect of fathers on daughters
is smaller and only signicant if no other control variables are included.
Mothers neither have an eect on sons nor on daughters. Three possible
explanations for this results are conceivable. First of all, the insignicant
results might indicate that children's risk behavior is not based on their
mother's function as a role model. Secondly, as many mothers also face
other obligations, their current occupational choice is likely to be driven by
other factors than risk. If mothers' actual risk attitude and the riskiness
of their job are thus little related (as is indicated by the particularly low
correlation between stated and revealed measures), this might explain why
we are unable to establish a relationship. The third and most plausible
explanation is that the risk measure is more representative with respect to
males. If the approximation of earnings risk is less precise for females it
is dicult to establish a relationship. A similar explanation might apply
as to why we also only nd very weak evidence for daughters' and fathers'
occupational risk being correlated.
194 Robustness Checks
The robustness of our results can be challenged in dierent respects. On the
one hand, the calculation of the risk measure might be of concern. We check
the robustness by calculating dierent modications. A comparison of all
resulting risk measures is given in table 9.9 Furthermore, the robustness of
the transmission eect might raise questions. We try to address these issues
with additional tests.
In the following, we focus on the fathers' eect and additionally report
results from regressions only including sons. We checked whether mothers
have a signicant eect for all specications and obtained the same results
as in the main regressions, i.e., a smaller and insignicant eect.
4.1 Robustness of risk measure
Taking into account the relative nature of income risk The theory
of compensating wage dierentials postulates that workers are compensated
for bearing risks, in our case unsystematic variation of income. As has been
described above, workers that are less risk averse are more likely to opt for
such occupations in expectation of the compensation they will earn. This
is the very basis for the approach of this study. One might, however, argue
that, if only compensation is sucient, all workers are willing to accept a
risky job. To exclude such eects, we control for an individual's income in
some of the specications above and nd that income has no eect on the
willingness to take income risks. Nevertheless, the variable is potentially
endogenous making it dicult to unambiguously identify eects.
An alternative is to already consider income when calculating the risk
measure. We divide the variation of the residual, i.e., the previously employed
risk measure, by the mean of log income in the respective occupation to
account for the relative nature of income risk. As before, the male income
risk is higher than the female income risk on average; the same holds for the
standard deviation, as can be seen in table 9.
9Results on all Mincer regressions are not reported. Available upon request.
20The set of control variables is the same as in the baseline regression except
for the income variables, which are not included. We thus estimate models
1,2 and 4 described in the previous section. In table 8, the results of the
regressions of children's risk on fathers' risk as well as sons' on fathers' risk
are shown. As can be seen, the results strongly resemble the results obtained
in the baseline regressions. Since income is now already considered in the
risk measure, the bivariate regression reveals a slightly lower correlation. If
the other control variables are added, the same eect is found as before. As
in the previous regressions, the correlation is larger between fathers and sons.
Private versus public sector As has already been indicated in the dis-
cussion of control variables for the Mincer regression, payment structures
in public and private sector employment dier in Germany. In the pub-
lic sector, the conditions of employment are regulated by federal and state
laws. Payment schemes are more strongly standardized and salary increases
due to age, tenure and the family situation rather than performance. The
signicant coecient in the transmission regressions in the previous section
indicates that dierences in income risk in fact exist.
To capture the dierences more precisely, we split the sample into em-
ployees that are employed in the private and public sector and re-estimate
Mincer regressions as described in section 2.3 with the sole dierence that
the public sector dummy is dropped. A consequence of splitting the sample
is that we are only able to calculate a risk measure for fewer occupations,
i.e., for males (females) for 66 (50) groups in private and for 39 (28) in public
employment. As expected, the mean unexplained variation of income is lower
in the public sector. Gender dierences in the mean occupational risk are
smaller for public servants. We assign the risk measure to family members
according to their occupation and whether they work in the public sector or
not.
Due to the consideration of employment status in the calculation of the
risk measure it is unnecessary to control for public/private sector employ-
ment. In table 10, the results on the intergenerational transmission regres-
sions using separate risk measures for public and private sector are shown.
21The results largely resemble the results obtained with one combined measure
for private and public sector employment. The magnitude of the coecient
on the father's risk slightly diers from the one obtained in the baseline re-
gressions, even though the dierence is not signicant. The signicance of
the coecient drops to the 5% level (10% in regressions on sons' risk) once
we take the fathers' characteristics into account. A possible explanation is
that the risk measure, in particular the one for public sector employees, is
now calculated using fewer observation, which makes it subject to a larger
variation.
The Mincer residual - a measure of risk versus ability A possible
objection to the risk measure is that the residual captures a variety of un-
observable factors besides compensation for occupational risk. In particular,
ability is presumed to be an important determinant of earnings that can
hardly be observed in large-scale surveys. The Mincer residual in fact has
also been employed as a measure of ability. However, the calculation diers.
The Mincer residual as a proxy for ability is used in its pure form, i.e., the
residual generated in the regressions is employed in the analysis (e.g. Mwabu
and Schultz 1996). In contrast, if the Mincer residual is employed as a mea-
sure of risk the variance of the residual over several individuals is calculated
- as has extensively been described above. This ensures that the measure is
largely detached from individual ability.
In order to remove remaining doubts, we searched for a proxy for an
individual's ability to be included in the Mincer regression. In the SOEP
interviews, measures of cognitive ability have recently been added but are
only available for a minor number of respondents. The only measure that
is available at a larger scale, though still only for a quarter of the observa-
tions used in the baseline Mincer regressions, are the grades received during
school. Grades have been requested in the biography questionnaire for per-
sons entering SOEP since 2001 (\What grade or points did you get in your
last report card"). While this is of course an insucient indicator of ability,
it at least seems qualied to be used as a proxy.
We thus include the mean of the individuals' grades in mathematics and
22German lessons into the baseline Mincer regressions. As expected, the re-
sults indicate that better grades in high school have a positive impact on an
individual's income. The number of occupations for which we are able to
calculate the variation of unexplained income drops from 85 (62) categories
to 47 (23) categories for male (female). To identify whether diering samples
matter for the calculation of the Mincer residual, we re-estimate the Mincer
regressions based on the sample for which we observe the reported grades but
exclude the grades as an explanatory variable. The two new risk measures
are almost the same with slightly lower values if ability is included. This
is not surprising, as now a larger fraction of the wage variance is explained.
Compared to the average risk measure from baseline Mincer regressions, the
new measures show an increase of mean and variance for men.
As a consequence of the reduced availability of the risk measures, the
number of father-child pairs in the transmission regressions is signicantly
reduced. The results of the regressions using the modied risk measure con-
trolling for ability via grades during school can be found in the upper half
of table 11. As before, we nd a signicantly positive eect of the fathers
on children and sons, respectively. The in
uence is, however, slightly lower
in magnitude and in signicance. The eect is similarly high in all models.
Comparing the results to the lower half of table 11 in which the comparative
measure is included shows large similarities with nearly identical coecients
for the child-father transmission. The diering results from the inclusion of
the grades into the Mincer regressions thus seem to be driven by the reduced
sample. Even so, we have to acknowledge that grades may not be a good
proxy for ability and success in one's career.
Limiting sample to West Germany Due to the fact that East Germany
only became part of the Federal Republic in 1990, we restricted the sample for
the calculation of the risk measure to 1991 to 2009 in the above regressions.
Furthermore, we include a dummy for East German inhabitants to control
for dierences in wages and risk taking. However, the occupational choice of
East Germans that started their career under socialism might be dierent.
Riskiness of job was much less an issue and politics severely in
uenced the
23choice of job. Fuchs-Sch undeln and Sch undeln (2005) argue that self-selection
due to risk aversion was absent in the German Democratic Republic. Due
to path-dependency, the current job of East Germans might not re
ect the
riskiness that they are willing to bear.
We thus limit the sample employed for the calculation of the Mincer
residual as well as for the transmission regressions to West Germans. In the
regressions, we drop the East German dummy. With the exclusion of East
Germans, the number of occupations for which we are able to calculate the
risk measure is reduced to 75 for males and for females to 51. The mean
income risk is slightly lower and varies to a larger extent for men.
The transmission dataset is reduced by up to 475 pairs. The regression
results can be found in table 12. They show an even stronger in
uence of
fathers on their children, especially on their sons. Compared to our baseline
results in table 6 and table 7, all coecients are higher in the regressions
with only West Germans. Nevertheless, t-tests reveal that the dierences are
not statistically signicant. These results thus indicate that the transmission
eect partly seems to be driven by the strong correlation of West German
parents and their children.
Stability of the risk measure over time A problem is that we cannot
observe the distribution of earnings risk in the year in which the respondents
chose their occupation. As a global measure of the income risk perceived
from an ex ante point of view, the measure calculated using the full period
thus seems to be the most reliable. However, it is possible that the earn-
ings risk changes over time (for example due to shocks or structural changes
in the economy) and individuals are constrained in continuous optimization
(for example due to incomplete information, cognitive limitations, transac-
tion costs). Observed choices then do not necessarily re
ect the underlying
preferences. Given path-dependencies, individuals from the parent genera-
tion might work in an occupation that is connected to another risk today
then it was when they decided. Parents might yet transmit the risk attitude
on which the decision was based.
For this reason, we calculate separate risk measures for the two decades
24that our sample for Mincer regressions covers. We observe a drop in the
number of occupations in particular for the measure from the earlier period.
A comparison of the mean of income risk in the period from 1991 to 1999
compared to a measure calculated from the years of 2000 to 2009 shows
an increase in unexplained variation of income over time (signicant at the
5%-level).
We attach the risk measure calculated from the subsample from 1991
to 1999 to parents. Children are assigned the occupational risk calculated
using the subsample from 2000 to 2009. We thereby account for parents and
children making their job choices at dierent times. This is of course a crude
approach as the decision made by parents and children might well have been
made in another period. The upper panel of table 13 displays the regressions
results. The baseline results are conrmed, albeit a decrease in signicance
and magnitude can be observed.
The results might be explained by children considering the current oc-
cupational risk of their parents. Furthermore, lacking optimization might
not be an issue. Since the job choice of all individuals is observed in the
period 2000 to 2009, the risk distribution based on the sample from 2000 to
2009 might be more appropriate. The lower panel of table 13 displays the
regression results with the more recent risk measure assigned to parents and
children. The result resemble the ndings of the baseline regressions to a
larger extent, with only slightly smaller coecients.
4.2 Robustness of transmission eect
In
uence of parents' rst job on children In the above regressions,
we observe the current choice of job of parents and children. An interesting
aspect is whether parents' and children's risk behavior is alike at a similar
stage in their life, i.e., when they are about the same age, have the same
family status etc. A possibility is to compare the risk associated with the
job pursued early in career. The SOEP provides information on the parents'
rst job.
We are therefore able to compare the riskiness of the children's job - which
25are presumably in an early stage of their career - with the parents' riskiness
of rst job. The set of parental control variables that is included in the
fourth model diers slightly. The dataset contains information on the age at
rst job, whether the individual was self-employed or employed in the public
sector and whether he was working full-time. We exclude parents that were
self-employed and not working full-time in their rst job and control for the
other two variables and the residence in youth to ensure comparability with
previous regressions. Information for education, family status and household
income at the parents' rst job is not available. Since these variables did not
show a signicant eect, this should be of little concern.
The information is available for about 1600 fathers, 400 of which are still
working in their rst job. On average, fathers are 19.11 years old when taking
up their rst job. We assign the risk measure from the total period to parents
according to the ISCO code of their rst occupation. The mean income risk is
lower in the rst job (0.2668) than in the current job (0.2850). A comparison
reveals stability of riskiness of job choice; the correlation between fathers'
rst and current job risk is 0.35. Taking into account that risk aversion
changes over the life cycle, this is a remarkable correlation.
Table 14 shows the regression results including the income risk of the
fathers' rst job as the main explanatory variable. The results of the re-
gressions including all children are largely similar to the ones obtained in
regressions with the current level of job. A drop of signicance of the co-
ecient on the variable of main interest to the 5%-level is observed in the
fourth model. If the sample is split by gender and only sons observed, coe-
cients resemble those previously found while signicance of the relationship
drops in models 2 to 4. Interestingly, the in
uence of fathers on daughters
is signicant for models 1 to 3 (not reported, available upon request). An
ad hoc explanation is that daughters more often remain stuck in their rst
job while sons already proceeded to a later career level when observed in our
sample. Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005) show that occupational mobility is
lower for women than for men.
26Transmission in dierent age groups Another question is whether chil-
dren of all age groups are equally in
uenced by their parents' willingness to
take income risks. Younger children might work in an occupation which is
only one step of the career path necessary to proceed to the occupation in
which they actually aim to work in - and which represents the riskiness they
are willing to take. As has been described in the previous paragraph, three
fourths of the fathers currently do not work in the occupation they named
as their rst job. In contrast, comparatively older children are more likely to
work in their favored occupation. This is supported by Bonin et al. (2007)
who nd that the sorting eect according to risk preferences is stronger for
individuals with more years of experience.
We split the sample by the age of 25 which is the mean age in our sample
and also a reasonable age for having completed education. Furthermore, the
risk measure has been calculated from individuals older than 25. Results are
shown in table 15. As can be seen, the relationship between fathers' and
children's income risk is much weaker and at most signicant at the 10%-
level for children younger than 25. In contrast, the relationship between the
riskiness of the job choice by children that are 25 or older and the one by
their fathers' is larger than in the baseline regressions and is signicant. The
same changes can be observed in regressions based on sons only. Accordingly,
children sort into occupations with an income risk similar to their parents'
one at a later stage of life.
5 Conclusion
The determinants of risk preferences are an important concern in economic
research. In particular, the question has been raised whether risk preferences
are transmitted between generations. Prior research shows that children of
more risk-tolerant parents describe themselves as having similar preferences.
The present paper contributes to this line of research by providing the rst
evidence based on a real and major economic decision: the choice of occu-
pation. We investigate whether children show a similar willingness to take
income risks like their parents. Given the controversy regarding the appro-
27priate measurement of risk attitudes, it is of substantial interest to study
whether previous results can be conrmed based on observed risk taking
behavior. An important advantage of the approach is that we can study
whether children and parents also show similar risk preferences in exactly
the same situation.
To rule out the possibility that the link is due to resembling preferences
for a certain job instead of similarity in risk attitudes, children and parents
working in exactly the same occupation are excluded. We nd a highly sig-
nicant transmission eect from fathers to children, in particular to sons. No
signicant eect is found for mothers. One explanation is that the formation
of risk preferences is not in
uenced by the mothers' risk attitudes. However,
the literature generally takes the employed risk measure as being less reliable
for women. A variety of robustness checks provide broad support for these
ndings.
Based on a major economic decision, our study thus conrms intergenera-
tional transmission of risk attitudes. Family members of dierent generations
not only respond similarly but also behave accordingly.
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6 Appendix
31Table 1: Summary statistics Mincer regression
obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Males
logNETINC 67563 7.40 0.44 4.25 10.31
EXPB 67563 17.80 9.17 0 40
TEN 67563 11.03 9.24 0 42.3
EDUC 67563 12.23 2.71 7 18
PUBSEC 67563 0.22 0.41 0 1
Females
logNETINC 31882 7.10 0.41 4.70 9.90
EXPB 31882 14.90 9.08 0 40
TEN 31882 9.74 8.51 0 40.8
EDUC 31882 12.55 2.72 7 18
PUBSEC 31882 0.37 0.48 0 1

















3 digit-ISCO dummies? YES YES
STATE dummies? YES YES
TIME dummies? YES YES
N 67563 31882
F 699.891 414.435
Adj. R2 0.570 0.582
Signicance levels :  : 10%  :
5%  : 1%. Dependent variable: log
monthly income of the respondent.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of risk measure for all family members
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Risk fathers 2114 0.2812 0.0498 0.1879 0.4688
Risk mothers 2101 0.2575 0.0302 0.2177 0.4191
Risk sons 1697 0.2817 0.0476 0.1879 0.4688
Risk daughters 1217 0.2615 0.0378 0.2177 0.4191
Correlations
with sons with daughters
Fathers 0.1756 0.1084
Mothers 0.0300 0.0488
32Table 4: Correlations between stated and revealed risk attitude
Stated \career" Stated \general"





Table 5: Summary statistics for transmission regressions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max
AGE 2836 25.6090 5.7598 17 47
FEMALE 2836 0.4193 0.4935 0 1
MARRIED 2835 0.1266 0.3326 0 1
HEALTH 2829 2.1184 0.7797 1 5
EDUC 2550 11.9422 2.5089 7 18
EXP 2833 3.6551 4.7363 0 25.8
TEN 2836 3.5349 3.8474 0 25.4
PUBSEC 2791 0.1834 0.3871 0 1
PROTESTANT 2836 0.2236 0.4167 0 1
RELAND 2836 0.0402 0.1965 0 1
NORELIGION 2836 0.2073 0.4055 0 1
RELMISS 2836 0.3170 0.4654 0 1
CATHOLIC 2836 0.2119 0.4087 0 1
EAST 2836 0.2507 0.4335 0 1
logNETINC 2826 6.7787 0.6883 3.7842 9.1050
Father
VAGE 2005 53.2110 6.7127 34 78
VEDUC 1976 11.9509 2.4525 7 18
VMARRIED 2005 0.9122 0.2830 0 1
VPUBSEC 1939 0.1949 0.3963 0 1
VlogHHINC 1889 8.0765 0.4859 6.2146 10.2647
VGREWLCITY 2005 0.0623 0.2418 0 1
VGREWMCITY 2005 0.0354 0.1849 0 1
VGREWSCITY 2005 0.0708 0.2566 0 1
VGREWCOUNTRY 2005 0.1322 0.3388 0 1
VGREWMISS 2005 0.6993 0.4587 0 1
Mother
MAGE 2078 50.6391 6.3759 35 75
MEDUC 2044 11.6485 2.2250 7 18
MMARRIED 2078 0.7897 0.4076 0 1
MPUBSEC 2024 0.3014 0.4590 0 1
MlogHHINC 1964 7.9654 0.5249 5.9915 10.6612
MGREWLCITY 2078 0.0592 0.2360 0 1
MGREWMCITY 2078 0.0423 0.2014 0 1
MGREWSCITY 2078 0.0630 0.2431 0 1
MGREWCOUNTRY 2078 0.1242 0.3298 0 1
MGREWMISS 2078 0.7113 0.4533 0 1
2001 2836 0.0709 0.2567 0 1
2002 2836 0.0832 0.2763 0 1
2003 2836 0.0649 0.2464 0 1
2004 2836 0.0829 0.2757 0 1
2005 2836 0.0705 0.2561 0 1
2006 2836 0.0642 0.2451 0 1
2007 2836 0.0815 0.2736 0 1
2008 2836 0.0892 0.2851 0 1

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 9: Descriptive statistics - Mincer residuals
Obs Num. of Cat. mean sd min max
Baseline Mincer residual
Male 67563 85 0.2909 0.0641 0.1879 0.4688
Female 31882 62 0.2718 0.0448 0.2177 0.4191
Relative nature of income risk
Male 67563 85 0.0392 0.0077 0.0241 0.0598
Female 31882 62 0.0382 0.0057 0.0304 0.0556
Public versus Private Sector
Male Public 13468 39 0.2575 0.0578 0.1745 0.4589
Female Public 11070 28 0.2528 0.0499 0.1986 0.3965
Male Private 51900 66 0.2961 0.0665 0.2099 0.4749
Female Private 19462 50 0.2691 0.0395 0.1983 0.3895
Including ability - grades
Male 14974 47 0.3007 0.0707 0.1807 0.5196
Female 6231 23 0.2714 0.0497 0.1983 0.4355
Ability - comparable sample
Male 14974 47 0.3008 0.0707 0.1836 0.5218
Female 6231 23 0.2714 0.0497 0.1984 0.4355
West Germans only
Male 51330 75 0.2812 0.0673 0.1686 0.4788
Female 20490 51 0.2644 0.0443 0.2032 0.4097
Restriction of sample to 1991-1999
Male 27606 61 0.2686 0.0608 0.1859 0.4625
Female 11963 35 0.2460 0.0437 0.1952 0.4281
Restriction of sample to 2000-2009
Male 37043 65 0.2883 0.06511 0.18120 0.4707
Female 16889 45 0.2738 0.0432 0.2145 .3982
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